Today we decided to release a serie of blog posts regarding the APT kill chain, in an effort to share our experience and knowledge on this hot topic. For starters, “APT” stands for Advanced Persistent Threat. Some people do not use this word at all, considering that this acronym is just a buzzword, created by
This blog post is part of a series on APT killchain. On this blog post we focus on the reconnaissance step. All the information written here comes directly from our observations and experience on APT incident handling and APT pentest simulations. Time for action has started. The attackers have chosen one target, now they have
The PWC-named malware OrcaRat is presented as a new piece of malware but looking at the URI used for C&C communication, it could be an updated version of a well-known and kind of old piece of malware: LeoUncia. Status Let’s face it: px~NFEHrGXF9QA=2/5mGabiSKSCIqbiJwAKjf+Z81pOurL1xeCaw=1/xXiPyUqR/hBL9DW2nbQQEDwNXIYD3l5EkpfyrdVpVC8kp/4WeCaArZAnd+QEYVSY9QMw=2 URI taken from an OrcaRat sample.It looks a lot like: qFUtb6Sw/TytLfLsy/HnqI8QCX/ZRfFP9KL/_2yA9GIK/iufEXR2r/e6ZFBfoN/fcgL04f7/ZBzUuV5T/Balrp2Wm URI taken from
In the previous OXID Resolver Part 1 article [1], a way to remotely enumerate the network interfaces on a recent Windows OS machine has been described. This method does not require the knowledge of user credentials and relies on the ServerAlive2() RPC method. The latter is held by the IOXIDResolver interface. This article is dedicated
